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On the Dynamic Dimension of Codetermination
Uwe Jirjahn, Jens Mohrenweiser and Uschi Backes-Gellner
1. INTRODUCTION
Works councils have attracted considerable attention as an alternative formof
worker representation to improve both the quality of working life and
economic performance. They play an important role in corporate governance
in many West European countries (Rogers and Streeck 1995). Specifically
Germanworks councils have acquired extensive powers compared to councils
in other countries.1 Those powers have even been strengthened by the actively
debated 2001 amendment of theWorks Constitution Act (WCA), the law that
governs the works council system. Works councils play also a role outside
Europe. In Korea, mandated councils deal with productivity concerns,
employee training, and health and safety issues (Kleiner and Lee 1997). In
Canada, nonunion representation has a long tradition.Mandatory health and
safety committees have been introduced in several provinces. Furthermore,
committees must be set up in case of layoffs and plant closures. Canada’s
mandatory committees are similar to European works councils (Adams 1985).
In theUS, the interest in nonunion representation has been spurred by a sharp
decline in union density and the growthof a ‘representation gap’ (Freemanand
Rogers 1999). Much of the political discussion in the US has centered on the
idea of mandating German-style works councils.
Economists have also shown strong interest in codetermination. This is
documented by a remarkably increasing number of econometric studies on the
consequences of German works councils. While earlier studies found rather
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1. Because of their strong codetermination rights it is particularly interesting to examine the economic
effects of works councils in Germany (Mohrenweiser et al. 2011). While works councils in other
European countries typically have less strong participation rights, only establishment-level codeter-
mination in the Netherlands and Austria comes close to that in Germany.
negative economic effects, recent examinations typically obtain neutral or
positive effects on training, employee retention, productivity, innovation,
investment, family friendly practices, and the use of performance related pay
(Addison et al. 2001, Askildsen et al. 2006, Frick andMoeller 2003, Heywood
and Jirjahn 2002, 2009, Huebler and Jirjahn 2003, Jirjahn and Kraft 2007,
2011, Mueller 2011, Smith 2006, Wagner 2008). However, most of the
econometric studies treat works councils as a single type of organization by
using a simple dummy variable for the presence of a council. In contrast, case
studies confirm that councils are in practice heterogeneous (Mueller-Jentsch
1995). There is a range of industrial relations regimes characterized by different
interactions of works council and management. In some establishments,
councils have extremely adversarial relationships with management. In
other establishments, councils play an important role in building cooperative
employer-employee relations. While case studies indicate that using a
simple dummy variable for the presence of a council may result in misleading
estimates, they provide no systematic analysis of the circumstances underwhich
adversarial or cooperative relations between council and management result.
This article provides such an analysis.We examine the role of learning in the
functioning ofworks councils. The dynamic dimensionof codetermination has
been neglected in economic studies on works councils. Both theoretical and
empirical analyses implicitly assume that a council instantaneously lives up to
its potential once it has been created. In contrast, we hypothesize that learning
implies a change in the nature and scope of codetermination over time. Even
though information rights of works councils help reducing information
asymmetries between employer and employees, this does not mean that
problems of asymmetric information instantaneously disappear. Particularly
a newly created council may face information problems. In order to elicit
credible information from the employer, the inexperienced council is more
likely to use its codetermination rights for conflictual negotiations. As time
goes by, learning enables worker representatives to develop the ability to
understand production processes and economic issues in more detail. As an
experienced council can more easily verify the information provided by
management, conflictual negotiations diminish. Furthermore, to the extent
the council improves its competence, the influence on decisions is growing.
Finally, as experienced worker representatives have a better understanding of
the economic situation of the establishment, the employer’s incentive to
opportunistically manipulate information provided to the employees is re-
duced. This in turn stimulates workers’ effort and cooperativeness. However,
wealsodiscuss the roleof a codetermination life cycle.Experiencesare typically
accumulatedwithin organizational routines. Those routinesmay contribute to
increased obsolescence. Thus, the age of the council may have an inversely
u-shaped effect on cooperation and performance.
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Our empirical analysis yields four key results. First, the probability of an
adversarial relationship between management and council is decreasing in the
age of the council. Second, the council’s age is positively associated with the
probability that the council has an influence even on decisions where it has no
legal powers. Third, productivity is increasing in the age of the council. Fourth,
the quit rate is decreasing in the age of the council. These results provide
striking evidence that learning indeed plays a role in the functioning of
codetermination. However, our analysis also provides some evidence of a
codetermination life cycle. After about thirty years the council’s influence on
decisions and its effect on productivity decrease to some extent. At the same
time the probability of an adversarial relationshipwithmanagement increases.
While the dynamic dimension of codetermination has been ignored in
previous studies on works councils, our analysis is related to a small number
of studies examining the dynamic effects of HRM practices. Evidence from
Japan (Kato2006) and theUS(Ben-Ner andLluis 2011) suggests that the scope
of employee involvement programs expandsas timegoesby.Moreover, studies
for Denmark (Eriksson 2003), Japan (Jones and Kato 1995, Kato and
Morishima 2002) and the US (Helper 1998) show that it takes time for
participatory HRM practices to fully deliver higher performance effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
theoretical background discussion. Section 3 describes the data and variables.
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Solving Employers’ Commitment Problems by Codetermination
Industrial relations in Germany are characterized by a dual structure of
employee representation with both unions and works councils. While unions
negotiate over wages and general aspects of employment contracts, works
councils provide a highly developed mechanism for establishment-level partici-
pation.2 Their rights are defined in theWCA,which was introduced in 1952 and
amended in 1972, 1989 and 2001. Workers in establishments with five or more
employeesmay elect councilmembers but the creation of the council depends on
the initiative of the workers. Hence, councils are not present in all eligible
establishments. Works councils negotiate over a bundle of establishment
policies. On some issues they have the right to information and consultation,
on others a veto power over management initiatives and on still others the right
2. Note that establishment-level codetermination through works councils is entirely separate from the
system of board-level codetermination (FitzRoy and Kraft 2005).
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to coequal participation. Works councils have functions that are distinct from
those of unions. They do not have the right to strike. Moreover, theWCA does
not allow wage negotiations. The aim is to restrict distributional conflicts.
Ratherworks councils are designed to increase joint establishment surplus.They
are required to cooperatewithmanagement ‘in a spirit ofmutual trusty for the
good of the employees and of the establishment.’
The existence of commitment problems is one explanation as to why work
councilsmay play the role in fostering cooperative industrial relations. There is
a variety of situations in which commitment problems of employers can arise.
For example, employers can behaveopportunisticallywith respect to the use of
information. They may conceal health and safety problems from the workers
or may pretend that the economic situation of the firm requires increased
worker effort. Moreover, employers may use information obtained from the
workers against workers’ interest. They may use it for organizational change
entailing job loss or intensification of work load.
If commitment problems are not solved, inefficiencies within the establish-
ment will result. Employees anticipating employer opportunism are very likely
to withhold effort and cooperation. If information about performance-enhan-
cing innovations is in the hands of employees, theymay notwish to reveal it for
the fear that the employer might use the information to their disadvantage.
Furthermore, information asymmetries can cause workers to refuse conces-
sions even when those concessions are necessary to overcome a crisis of the
establishment. If employees do not share the same economic information
possessedbymanagement, theymay fear that the employer overstates the crisis
to demand greater concessions. On the employer’s side, low cooperativeness of
the workforce results in low productivity and innovativeness. On the employ-
ees’ side, low cooperativeness implies that workers forego the opportunity of
better working conditions.
Theory suggests that worker representation is oneway to foster cooperation
(Freeman and Lazear 1995, Osterloh and Frey 2006, Smith 2006). Providing a
council with information rights helps reducing information asymmetries. This
makes it easier to verify the employer’s claims.Moreover, providing the council
with codetermination rights helps avoiding that the employer unilaterally takes
actionswithout consideringworkers’ interests. Hence, works councils have the
potential to realize mutual gains for employers and employees by solving
commitment problems.
2.2 The Role of Learning
However, from a theoretical point of view, there is nomechanical relationship
between codetermination and cooperative employer-employee relations. It is
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not very likely that once created a works council instantaneously lives up to its
potential. Several reasons suggest that learning plays an important role in the
functioning of codetermination.
Eventhough information rightshelp reducing informationasymmetries, this
does not mean that these asymmetries instantaneously and completely dis-
appear once the council has been created. If the establishment opens its books
to a newly created works council, this information may be only of limited
relevance. Information on the past and recent economic situation of the
establishment only partly reveals information on future prospects (Kennan
and Wilson 1993). Hence, the employer may still have private information on
predictions of demandand production.Moreover, information on actual costs
does not reveal information on opportunity costs. The employermay still have
private information on the opportunities to redeploy capital in other locations
or industries, or to substitute capital for labor. Altogether, managers still have
opportunities to use remaining information advantages strategically.
However, the WCA provides the works council also with codetermination
rights. These rights strengthenworkers’ bargaining power and imply increased
scope for negotiations between workforce andmanagement. The crucial point
is that negotiations can be seen as a learning process (Cross 1977). Recent
bargaining models show that conflict plays an important role in such learning
process (Cramton andTracy 2003,Kennan andWilson 1993). This insight can
be applied to codetermination. Works councils can use their codetermination
rights to elicit credible information from the employers by delaying decisions.
The council may demand extensive consultations when the employer contends
that ensuring the establishment’s competitiveness requires higher effort of the
workforce. Managers’ willingness to enter conflictual negotiations serves as a
signal of their credibility. Conflict as a method to elicit credible information is
particularly important when there are substantial information asymmetries
between the employer and the council. This ismore likely to hold true in case of
a newly created works council. In that case, worker representatives have little
experience and face difficulties in verifying the employer’s claims.
Codetermination may change in its nature and scope as time goes by.
Participation in decision making involves learning by doing. During consulta-
tion and negotiation with management, the works council elicits valuable
information. This allows accumulating long-term relevant experience. Learn-
ing enables the council to develop over time the ability to understand the
production process and the economic situation of the establishment in more
detail. Hence, information asymmetries between management and works
council diminish. As the council can more easily verify new information
provided by management, conflictual negotiations are less likely to occur over
time. Diminishing conflicts imply that less time is lost due to delays in decision
making.
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Of course, the learning process entailed by codetermination is not one-sided.
The employer will also change his attitudes and behavior as time goes by.
Because the works council is initially inexperienced, the employer may have a
higher incentive to behave opportunistically with respect to a newly created
council. The employer’s incentive to strategically manipulate information is
reduced if he learns thatan experiencedworks council canmore easily verify his
claims. Instead of strategic manipulation and adversarial bargaining, the
employer is more likely to rely on building trust and cooperation with the
works council. This in turn implies that workers’ effort and cooperativeness
increase. Similarly, Lorenz (1999) argues that theWCA provides a procedural
framework fostering reciprocal trust building. Employer and employees donot
only learn about the surrounding environment but also about each other. This
learning process may follow a ‘step-by-step’ rule. Employer and works council
start by making small commitments to each other and then increase their
commitments depending on the quality of their interactions. This implies that
the positive effect of codetermination on employer-employee cooperation and
establishment performance should grow over time.
The learning process should also entail an increasing influence of the works
council. While an inexperienced council is likely to rely on conflict to obtain
credible information, its influence on decisionmay be limited in the end.As the
council lacks experience, it may face difficulties in providing own solutions.
Moreover, if management fears that an inexperienced council may harm the
quality of decisions, it will try to ignore the council. However, to the extent the
council accumulates experience, it can come up with own valuable ideas.
If management recognizes that the council can contribute to economic
performance, it will ask the council to participate in a wider range of decisions.
In summary, theoretical considerations suggest that the consultations and
negotiations entailed by codetermination provide the framework for a unique
learning process. This process has important implications.While codetermina-
tion initially may involve increased conflicts, adversarial negotiations between
management and works council will diminish in the course of time.Moreover,
the influence of the works council on decisions and its positive effect on
establishment performance should increase over time.Of course, learning is no
guarantee that cooperative industrial relations are always achieved.Thecrucial
point is that learning should make those relations more likely.
2.3 A Possible Codetermination Life Cycle
Building on theories of organizational learning (Crossan et al. 1999, Sorensen
and Stuart 2000), it can be argued that routines play a role in the learning
process entailed by codetermination. Lessons from past interactions of works
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council and management are accumulated within routines. Those routines
include procedures, conventions and the structure of beliefs.Management and
council gradually adopt routines that lead to favorable outcomes. Routines
formamemory of the firm that ismaintained despite the turnover of individual
managers andworks councilors.Newmanagers andworks councilors learn the
routines through a process of socialization. However, routines are not simply
the result of accumulated experiences. Once established, they guide further
learning. The search for new solutions typically occurs in the neighborhood of
already existing routines.On theone hand, this leads to a refinement of existing
routines. On the other hand, this repeated use may contribute to increased
inertia andobsolescence (SorensenandStuart 2000, Thornhill andAmit 2003).
Previously successful routines may be relied upon inappropriately in novel
situations that require substantial change.
This may imply a codetermination life cycle (Strauss 2006). Up to a certain
point the scope and theperformance effects of codeterminationare increasing in
the age of the works council. Yet, beyond that point they decrease as time goes
by. To provide an example, the way how to aggregate and represent workers’
preferences is likely to be an important part of the works council’s routines.
A codetermination life cyclewould imply that the council’s established practices
of representingworker interestsmaybecome less effectivebeyondacertainpoint
in time. Indeed, studies by Addison et al. (2007) and Jirjahn and Tsertsvadze
(2006) indicate that worker organizations in Germany face difficulties in
adjusting to changing workforce structures and new work arrangements.
3. DATA AND VARIABLES
3.1 Data Set
Weusedata fromthe IfMBonnWorksCouncil Survey conductedby the Small
and Medium Size Enterprise Research Institute (Institut fu¨r Mittelstands-
forschung – IfM). The survey provides a data set of small- and medium-sized
establishments in Germany (Schloemer et al. 2007). The data were collected in
2005 on the basis of a questionnaire sent to the owner or top manager of the
establishment. They are representative of establishments with 20 to 500
employees. Our data set is unique in that it has a strong focus on establish-
ment-level codetermination. Specifically, it contains information on the year
the workforce of the establishment has introduced a works council.3
3. Previous studiesonworks councils used theHanoverPanelor the IABEstablishmentPanel.However,
those data are not helpful in addressing the question of our study. The Hanover Panel contains no
information on the age of the council while the information contained in the IABEstablishment Panel
is highly incomplete. Even though the data set to some extent allows calculating the age of works
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3.2 Dependent Variables
Table 1 shows the definitions of the dependent variables and their descriptive
statistics. We use two indicators of the quality of industrial relations. These
indicators are only available for establishments with a works council. The first
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if management views the relationship with the
works council as being bad. Bad relationships between management and
councils are reported by 10percent of the respondents. The second variable is a
dummy equal to 1 if the council is involved in decisions even where it has no
legal powers. Works councils have such strong influence on decisions in 36
percent of the establishments.
Moreover, we use two indicators of establishment performance. The
performance effects of works councils have attracted remarkable interest.
Specifically, the link between works councils and establishment output has
been widely examined. We measure the establishment’s output by the log of
productivity with productivity being defined as sales per employee. The link
between worker representation and personnel turnover has also been of great
Table 1
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables
Variable Description Establishments
With Works
Council
Mean, Std.dev
Establishments
Without
Works Council
Mean, Std.dev.
Bad Relation Dummy variable equal to 1 if
management views the relationship
with the works council as being bad.
.0996, .3001
(N5 241)
–
Strong Influence Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
works council is involved in decisions
even where it has no legal powers.
.3609, .4813
(N5 241)
–
LnProductivity Log of sales (in Euros) per employee. 11.85, 1.034
(N5 222)
11.39, 1.028
(N5 298)
Quit Rate Number of quits by workers during
the last year divided by the number of
total employees.
.0196, .0236
(N5 236)
.0259, .0284
(N5 302)
Information on the variables Bad Relation and Strong Influence is only available for establishments
where a works council is present.
councils introduced after 1993, this is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, as the question on the
presence of aworks council is not asked regularly in everywave, it is not possible to calculate the exact
age of every council that has been newly created. Second, given the relatively short time span of the
IAB Establishment Panel one could only examine rather young works councils. Third, the
introduction of a council is a relatively rare event. The overwhelming majority of establishments do
not change theirworks council status.Hence, focusingonyoungworks councils implies thatwewould
only have a handful of observations.
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interest. We use the rate of quits by workers as an inverse performance
indicator. A low quit rate indicates high job satisfaction and the willingness
of workers to provide effort and to invest in their firm-specific human capital.
3.3 Explanatory Variables
The definitions of the explanatory variables and their descriptive statistics are
shown in Table 2. Importantly, the survey asks the year in which the works
council has been introduced by the workforce. Hence, we can calculate the age
Table 2
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables
Variable Description Establishments
With
Works Council
Mean, Std.dev.
Establishments
Without
Works Council
Mean, Std.dev.
Age of works council Time span between the year 2005 and
the year the works council has been
introduced by the workforce.
19.24, 16.33 –
(Age of works council)2 Squared age of the works council. 635.5, 892.7 –
Size Number of total employees in the
establishment.
185.5, 121.9 99.22, 126.95
Size2/1000 Squarednumber of total employees in
the establishment divided by 1000.
49.21, 56.14 14.81, 34.27
LnSize Log of the number of total employees
in the establishment
4.94, .8300 4.11, .8100
University graduates University graduates as a proportion
of total employees.
1737, .2182 .1676, .2248
Skilled blue-collar
employees
Blue-collar employees with
apprenticeship training as a propor-
tion of total employees.
.2463, 2401 .2038, .2399
Skilled white-collar
employees
White-collar employees with appren-
ticeship training as a proportion of
total employees.
.3530, .2323 .3716, .2638
Part-time employees Part-time employees as a proportion
of total employees.
.2106, .3041 .2178, .2987
Female employees Women as a proportion of total
employees.
.3703, .3309 .405, .2880
Strong support by
workforce
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
workforce strongly supports the
works council.
.2796, .4498 –
Modest support by
workforce
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
workforce modestly supports the
works council.
.6610, 4744 –
Direct participation Dummy variable equal to 1 if
there exist direct forms of worker
involvement in decision making.
.4195, .4945 .3212, .4677
Managed by successor Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
establishment ismanaged by anactive
owner who is not the founder of the
establishment.
.2161, .4125 .3377, .4737
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of the council. The average age in the sample is 19 years. The age of the works
council is our explanatory variable of primary interest. Our theoretical
considerations imply that the age of the works council should be negatively
associatedwith personnel turnover and the probability of bad relations between
council and management. It should be positively associated with the council’s
influence on decisions and establishment output. In order to investigate the role
of a possible codetermination life cycle, we also include the squared age.
The data provide a rich set of control variables. Establishment size is
captured by the number of employees. While theory suggests a positive
relationship between size and output, the effect on the quality of industrial
relations is less clear. A council may mitigate transaction costs in large
establishments, where the need for communication is higher. This implies a
stronger influence of the councils. On the other hand, large establishments are
more hierarchical. This may limit the influence of the council.
The structure of the workforce is accounted for by variables for the
proportion of university graduates, skilled white-collar employees, skilled
blue-collar employees, part-time employees, and women. The qualification
Table 2. (Contd)
Variable Description Establishments
With
Works Council
Mean, Std.dev.
Establishments
Without
Works Council
Mean, Std.dev.
Managed by founder Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
establishment is managed by an
active owner who founded the
establishment.
.1483, .3562 .4470, .4980
Collective agreement Dummy variable equal to 1 if
the establishment is covered by a
collective bargaining agreement.
.5889, .4931 .2583, .4384
Strong influence of
unions
Dummy variable equal to 1 if unions
have strong influence on the works
council.
.4407, .4975 –
Modest influence of
unions
Dummy variable equal to 1 if unions
have a modest influence on the works
council.
.2118, .4095 –
Employment growth Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
establishment experienced a positive
employment growth during the last
three years.
.2831, .4515 .3642, .4820
Subsidiary Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
establishment is a subsidiary.
.1610, .3683 .0927, .2905
East Germany Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
establishment is located in East
Germany.
.2288, .4209 .1887, .3920
N 236 302
Information on the variables Age of Works Council, (Age of Works Council)2, Strong Support by
Workforce, Modest Support by Workforce, Strong Influence of Unions, and Modest Influence of
Unions are only available for establishments where a works council is present.
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of the workforce should have a positive effect on the establishment’s produc-
tivity. Moreover, high shares of qualified workers should be associated with
reduced personnel fluctuation as establishments typically use internal labor
markets to bindhighly qualified employees. Theworkforce is also likely to play
a role in the quality of industrial relations. The works council’s influence on
decisions shoulddependon the supportby the employees.Thus,we include two
dummy variables for a strong or modest support provided by the workforce.
We also take into account that councils are part of a broader industrial
relations system that involves worker representation through unions. First, we
include a dummy for collective bargaining coverage. Second, dummies for a
strong or modest influence of unions on the works council are included.
Support by unions should increase the council’s influence on decisions. The
influence of unionsmay even strengthen the productive role of works councils.
Industry-level bargaining reduces distributional conflicts at the establishment
level (Heywood et al. 1998). Moreover, unions may provide the councils with
expertise to strengthen their position against opportunistic employers.
The managerial environment is captured by variables for the presence of
active owners. First, an indicator for establishmentsmanaged by its founders is
included. Second, we include a variable for establishments managed by active
owners who are not the founders. Theoretical models (Singell and Thornton
1997) and empirical findings (Benz and Frey 2004) suggest that active owners
gain utility from being the ultimate bosses. As codetermination limits their
discretionary power, active owners are likely to restrict the council’s influence.
This might even entail a positive view toward the council if the autocratic style
of leadership involves a quiet life for the active owners. Active ownership may
also have an effect on performance. On the one hand, it may involve reduced
agency problems. On the other, it may imply that owners forego the
opportunity to implement a high-ability management (Bennedsen et al. 2007).
We also include a dummy for directworker involvement in decisionmaking.
Directworkerparticipation is often viewedasa substitute for codetermination.
Thus, it may undermine the council’s influence. However, from a theoretical
view point, direct worker involvement and codetermination may be rather
complementary. Direct worker involvement does not necessarily solve com-
mitment problems.Whilemanagersmay exante promise todelegate authority,
they may ex post be tempted to overrule employees’ decisions. A council can
ensure that promises made are kept.
Further, variables for establishments located in East Germany and establish-
ments that are subsidiaries of multi-establishment firms are included. Five
industry dummies for manufacturing, construction, retail, logistic and commu-
nication, services for companies, and services for privates account for variations
in the nature of what is being produced. Finally, a dummy for positive employ-
ment growth in the last three years is included.While a councilmaybe important
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for rebuilding trust in establishments with declining employment (Jirjahn 2009,
2010), this is not likely to occurwithout conflict. Thus, growth should reduce the
probability of a bad relationship between council and management.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Intra-Establishment Industrial Relations
Table 3 provides estimates of the determinants of intra-establishment indus-
trial relations. The determinants were estimated with the probit procedure.
Note that these estimates are restricted to establishments with works councils
as the dependent variables specifically measure the quality of the relationship
between management and works council.
Many of the control variables take statistically significant coefficients of the
expected sign. Managers in establishments with positive employment growth
Table 3
Determinants of Intra-Establishment Industrial Relations
Dependent Variables
Explanatory Variables
(1)
Bad Relation
Method: Probit ML
(2)
Strong Influence
Method: Probit ML
Age of works council 2 .0694 (2.20) .0691 (3.25)
(Age of works council)2 .0013 (2.24) 2 .0011 (2.81)
Size .0044 (0.94) 2 .0064 (2.15)
Size2/1000 2 .0062 (0.65) .0113 (1.78)
University graduates 2 .9204 (1.07) .2554 (0.43)
Skilled blue-collar employees 2 .5178 (0.54) 2 .1236 (0.21)
Skilled white-collar employees 1.5938 (1.98) 2 .5311 (0.96)
Part-time employees 2 .3415 (0.65) .0331 (0.09)
Female employees 2 1.3356 (1.33) 2 .0006 (0.01)
Strong support by workforce 2 2.5611 (4.27) 2.2235 (4.09)
Modest support by workforce 2 1.269 (2.73) 1.326 (2.57)
Direct participation 2 .4013 (1.42) 2 .1078 (0.54)
Managed by successor 2 1.6092 (3.46) 2 .8538 (3.16)
Managed by founder .2309 (0.55) 2 .0199 (0.08)
Collective agreement 2 .0609 (0.19) .3539 (1.68)
Strong influence of unions .8971 (2.45) .2673 (1.11)
Modest influence of unions .1379 (0.33) .3958 (1.40)
Employment growth 2 1.1899 (3.88) .1949 (0.93)
East Germany 2 .2757 (0.76) .3572 (1.41)
Subsidiary .3896 (0.88) 2 .4416 (1.60)
Constant 2 .1758 (0.20) 2 1.853 (2.42)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 .34 .20
N 241 241
The regressions are based on the subsample of establishments with a works council. Robust T-
statistics are in parentheses. Statistically significant at 1%; statistically significant at 5%;
statistically significant at 10%.
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during the last three years are less likely to report a bad relationship with the
works council. This suggests that there is less potential for conflicts in prospering
establishments.Establishment size isnegativelyassociatedwitha strong influence
of the works council. As larger establishments are more bureaucratic organiza-
tions, opportunities to influence decisions may be more limited. Support by the
workforce is significantly associated with a lower probability of a bad relation
between council andmanagement and a higher probability that the council has a
strong influence ondecisions. Further, the share of skilledwhite-collarworkers is
a positive determinant of a bad relationship between council and management.
White-collar workers are often thought to be individualistic. Hence, a high share
of white-collar workers indicates a heterogeneous workforce.
The broader industrial relations systemand themanagerial environment also
play a role.Collective bargaining is positively associatedwith ahigh influenceof
the council while strong union support of the council increases the likelihood of
a bad relationship with management. Interestingly, the presence of active
owners who are not the founders of the establishment is a negative covariate
of both a strong influence of the council and a bad relation between council and
management. Those types of active owners may gain specifically high utility
from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment and, hence, try to limit
the council’s influence. Isolating the council may result in a quiet life for the
active owners implying a more positive view of the relation with the council.
Turning to the explanatory variable of primary interest, the age of theworks
council is significantly associated with both indicators of the quality of intra-
establishment industrial relations. In the regression on a bad relationship
between council and management, the coefficient on the linear term is
significantly negative while the coefficient on the squared term is significantly
positive. The size of the estimated coefficients implies that the probability of a
bad relationship is decreasing in the age of the works council up to 27 years.
This supports the view that learning plays a role in the functioning of
establishment-level codetermination. Cooperation between works council
and management appears to be increasing for a remarkably long time.
However, afterwards the probability of a bad relationship is increasing in the
age of the council. This can be seen as evidence of a participation life cycle.
In the regression on the influence of the council, the coefficient on the linear
age variable is significantly positive while the coefficient on the squared term is
significantly negative. The size of the estimated coefficients implies that the
probabilityof a strong influence is increasing in theageof theworks councils up
to 32 years. This provides further support for the hypothesis that the dynamic
dimension of codetermination plays an important role. The council’s influence
ondecisions appears to be increasing for a very long time.However, afterwards
it is decreasing. Hence, also this regression provides evidence of a participation
life cycle.
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Altogether, for about 30 years both the probability of a cooperative
relationship with management and the probability of a strong influence on
decisions are increasing in the age of the works council. This indicates that a
remarkable learning process is at work. An impression of themagnitude of the
effect can be obtained by using the estimated coefficients to project the
probabilities. Table 4 provides the projections for different ages of the works
council. All of the control variables are assumed to be at their mean level.
As shown in column (1), the initial probability of a bad relationship with
management is about 4.4 percent. This probability decreases roughly by two
third within the first ten years. After thirty years it is only half a percent.While
the probability of a bad relationship is increasing after this point, it is below its
initial value even for a fifty-year-old works council. Column (2) provides the
projections on the influence of the council. The initial probability of a strong
influence is about 14 percent. It increases roughly by two fifth within the first
ten years. After thirty years this probability is almost 50 percent. Even though
the probability of a strong influence is decreasing thereafter, it appears to be
substantially higher than its initial level for a long time. The probability is
roughly 36 percent for a fifty-year-old council.
4.2 Establishment Performance
Wenow turn to the indicators of establishment performance. Columns (1) to (3)
of Table 5 provideOLS estimates of the determinants of the log of productivity.
Establishments inEastGermany appear to be less productive than those inWest
Germany. The share of university graduates is a positive and the share of female
employees a negative covariate of productivity. Interestingly, both variables for
active owners are significantly negative determinants. Further, the estimates
Table 4
Projections on Intra-Establishment Industrial Relations
Dependent Variables
Age of Works Council
(1)
Projected Probability
of Bad Relations
(2)
Projected Probability
of a Strong Influence
1 .044 .144
5 .026 .209
10 .016 .276
20 .006 .429
30 .005 .489
40 .009 .465
50 .026 .356
The probabilities of a bad relationwithmanagement are projected using the estimated coefficients in
column (1) of in Table 3. The probabilities of a strong influence are projected using the estimated
coefficients in column (2) ofTable 3.All of the other control variables are assumed tobe at theirmean
level.
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Table 5
Determinants of Establishment Performance
Dependent
Variables
Explanatory
Variables
LnProductivity (Method: OLS) Quit Rate (Method: Tobit ML)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works Council .2356 2 .0731 – 2 .0010 .0061 –
(2.52) (0.59) (0.30) (1.12)
Age ofworks council – .0305 .0276 – 2 .0007 2 .0008
(2.54) (2.04) (1.71) (2.15)
(Age of works
council)2
– 2 .0004 2 .0004 – .000001 .00001
(2.06) (1.82) (1.34) (1.62)
LnSize 2 .0271 2 .0509 .0959 .0010 .0017 .0025
(0.56) (1.03) (1.06) (0.66) (1.06) (1.06)
University graduates 1.1422 1.1458 1.055 2 .0253 2 .0252 2 .0227
(4.20) (4.24) (2.38) (2.85) (2.82) (1.95)
Skilled blue-collar
employees
.2945 .2826 2 .1948 2 .0332 2 .0333 2 .0267
(1.21) (1.17) (0.43) (3.84) (3.86) (2.47)
Skilled white-collar
employees
1.0722 1.0304 .5884 2 .0233 2 .0222 2 .0077
(4.27) (4.16) (1.21) (2.79) (2.67) (0.80)
Part-time employees 2 .1139 2 .1132 2 .2490 .0123 .0122 .0097
(0.68) (0.69) (1.03) (2.80) (2.79) (1.79)
Female employees 2 .9762 2 .9760 2 .8734 .0143 .0139 .0218
(4.55) (4.57) (2.40) (1.98) (1.95) (2.58)
Direct participation .0736 .0854 .1282 .0012 .0011 2 .0032
(0.86) (1.00) (1.03) (0.45) (0.38) (0.81)
Managed by
successor
2 .3105 2 .3169 2 .4005 2 .0032 2 .0032 2 .0076
(2.77) (2.81) (2.60) (0.94) (0.93) (1.60)
Managed by founder 2 .3139 2 .3213 2 .4183 2 .0002 2 .0001 2 .0057
(3.03) (3.14) (2.33) (0.05) (0.04) (0.95)
Collective agreement 2 .03642 2 .0456 2 .0463 2 .0038 2 .0035 2 .0065
(0.43) (0.54) (0.38) (1.26) (1.16) (1.74)
East Germany 2 .2150 2 .1887 2 .2567 2 .0007 2 .00014 2 .0017
(2.48) (2.19) (1.49) (0.23) (0.43) (0.40)
Subsidiary 2 .0349 2 .0005 .0841 2 .0088 2 .0098 2 .0087
(0.29) (0.00) (0.50) (2.38) (2.65) (1.77)
Strong influence of
unions
– – .2646 – – .0018
(1.71) (0.41)
Modest influence of
unions
– – .4784 – – 2 .0077
(2.00) (1.56)
Strong support by
workforce
– – .0768 – – 2 .0009
(0.27) (0.16)
Modest support by
workforce
– – 2 .1294 – – .0039
(0.51) (0.72)
Constant 11.92 12.00 11.40 .0204 .0183 .0232
(38.78) (38.78) (24.35) (1.98) (1.68) (1.41)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .37 .38 .36 – – –
Pseudo R2 – – – .07 .08 .10
N 520 520 222 538 538 236
Regressions (1), (2), (4) and (5) are basedon the full sample of establishments.Regressions (3) and (6)
are based on the subsample of establishments with a works council. Robust T-statistics are
in parentheses. Statistically significant at 1%; statistically significant at 5%; statistically
significant at 10%.
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show that support by unions is positively associated with productivity. This fits
the view that a strong council is more effective in increasing establishment
performance. However, moderate support by unions has the highest effect.
In regression (1), we use the full sample of establishments and include a
dummyvariable for thepresenceof aworks council. This is the typical approach
found in the literature. The estimation confirms that the presence of a works
council is positively associated with productivity. However, our theoretical
considerations suggest that the effects of establishment-level codetermination
are dynamically heterogeneous.Hence,we add the age of theworks council and
its square. The results shown in column (2) are again based on the full sample of
establishments. For those establishments without a works council, the age
variables are set equal to zero.The regression shows that thedynamicdimension
of codetermination also plays a role in the establishment’s productivity. While
the simple dummyvariable for the presence of a council is no longer a significant
determinant, the two age variables take statistically significant coefficients. The
linear age variable emerges with a positive coefficient while the squared term
takes a negative coefficient. This implies that the council’s age has an inversely
u-shaped influence on productivity. In regression (3), we restrict the sample to
establishments where a works council is present.4 This regression also shows an
inversely u-shaped relationship between the age of the council and the establish-
ment’s productivity. Productivity is increasing in the council’s age up to 35
years, after which it starts to fall. Altogether, also the productivity regressions
provide evidenceof both the importanceof a long-term learningprocess and the
role of a codetermination life cycle.
In column (1)of Table 6,weuse the estimated coefficients of regression (3) to
calculate projections.Theprojections confirm that the influenceof thedynamic
dimension of codetermination is also economically significant. On average
initial productivity is about 110000 Euros. After a works council has been
created, productivity increases by roughlyonequarterwithin thefirst tenyears.
Compared to the initial level, a thirty-year-old council is associated with an
increase in productivity by about one half. Even though the positive effect
of establishment-level codetermination is decreasing thereafter, it remains
substantial for a long time. Compared to the initial level, productivity is two
fifth higher in an establishment with a fifty-year-old works council.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 5 provide estimates of the determinants of the
quit rate. The determinants were estimatedwith the tobit procedure.While the
proportionof female employees is a positive covariate of thequit rate, the share
4. Building on the specification shown inTable 3,we include control variables for the influence of unions
and the support by theworkforce. However, wemake twominor changes to the specification in order
to improve the estimations. First, we use a different specification of establishment size. Second, we
remove the dummy variable for positive employment growth during the last three years.
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ofuniversity graduates and the share of skilledblue-collarworkers are negative
determinants. Establishments that are parts of multi-establishment firms
appear to have a lower quit rate.
In regression (4), the simple dummy variable for the presence of a works
council does not emerge with significant coefficient. This may reflect the
sometimesmixed results found inother studiesonworks councils andpersonnel
turnover.5 However, as regressions (5) and (6) make clear, the simple dummy
hides the dynamic dimension of codetermination. While regression (5) uses the
full sample of establishments, regression (6) is based on the subsample of
establishments where a council is present. Both regressions yield a very similar
pattern of results. The age of the works council is a significantly negative
determinant of the quit rate.An experiencedworks councilmaybemorehelpful
in implementing an effective personnel management. This in turn results in
increased job satisfaction and reduced fluctuation. However, the squared age
variable does not emerge as a statistically significant covariate of the quit rate.
Hence, this regression fails to provide evidence of a codetermination life cycle.
In column (2) of Table 6, the estimated coefficients of regression (6) are used
to calculate projections on the quit rate for different ages of the works council.
The control variables are again assumed to be at their mean level. Moreover,
as the coefficient on the squared age variable is statistically insignificant,
the squared age of the works council is also assumed to be at its mean level.
After a council has been implemented, the quit rate decreases by roughly one
tenth within the first ten years. A thirty-year-old works council is associated
with a decrease in the quit rate by almost two fifth.6
Table 6
Projections on Establishment Performance
Dependent Variables
Age of Works Council
(1)
Projected Productivity
in Euros
(2)
Projected
Quit Rate
1 109853 .036
5 121455 .034
10 135185 .031
20 157456 .026
30 168957 .022
40 166992 .019
50 154523 .016
Productivity is projected using the estimated coefficients in column (3) of Table 5. The quit rates are
projected using the estimated coefficients in column (6) of Table 5. All of the other control variables
are assumed to be at their mean level.
5. See for example the studies by Frick and Moeller (2003) and Kraft and Lang (2008).
6. Note that the tobitmodel is anonlinearmodel.Hence, even if the squaredagevariable is held constant,
the relationship between the council’s age and the predicted quit rate is nonlinear.
r 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 443
WORKS COUNCILS AND LEARNING
4.3 Testing for an (Inversely) U-Shaped Influence
Our estimates indicate that theworks council’s age has a u-shaped effect onbad
industrial relations and an inversely u-shaped effect on productivity and
decision power. However, Lind and Mehlum (2010) argue that the combina-
tion of a significant negative (positive) coefficient on a linear term and a
significant positive (negative) coefficient ona squared termdoes not necessarily
demonstrate an (inversely) u-shaped effect. They formalize a test for the
presence of such effect. Confirmation of the (inversely) u-shaped relationship
requires that the implied peak be within the range of observed values and be
sufficiently to the center of the range that the implied curvature results in a
significant negative (positive) slope left of the peak and a significant positive
(negative) slope right of the peak.As it is clear that the implied peaks arewithin
the range of the age variable, we implement Lind andMehlum’s test. It follows
from testing the composite null hypothesis that the slope left of the peak is non-
negative (non-positive) and/or the slope right of the peak is non-positive (non-
negative) against the alternative of a negative (positive) slope to the left and a
positive (negative) slope to the right. The estimates based on our data solidly
reject the composite null hypothesis. In both regressions on the quality of
industrial relations it is rejected with a p-value of 0.02, and in the productivity
regressionwith ap-valueof0.07.Thus, the formal test aswell as theappearance
from the projections indicates the presence of an (inversely) u-shaped effect.
4.4 Age of the Works Council vs. Age of the Establishment
Theageof the council and theageof theestablishmentarepositively correlated.
In our data, the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.67. To ensure that our
results do not simply capture the age of the establishment, we reestimated all
regressions by adding establishment age (and its square) as a further control.
Although this can potentially involve problems of collinearity, the pattern of
results on our key variables (the age and the squared age of the works council)
remained remarkably robust. Moreover, establishment age did not emerge
with a significant coefficient in any of the regressions. Hence, we are confident
that our findings indeed capture the effects of the council’s age.
5. CONCLUSIONS
While the number of econometric studies on works councils is remarkably
increasing, those studies are essentially silent on the role of learning. This article
provides evidence that codetermination involves an important dynamic dimen-
sion.Thequalityof industrial relations and theperformance-enhancing effect of
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codetermination are increasing in the age of the works council for a long period
of time. However, our estimates also provide evidence of a codetermination life
cycle. After about thirty years the quality of the relationship with management
and the effect on establishment performance decrease to some extent.
Our results show the functioning of codetermination in Germany in a fresh
and differentiated light. As stressed in the introduction, recent studies obtain
neutral or positive effects of works councils on establishment performance.
Neutral effects are typically obtained by studies examining the economic
consequences of newly created councils (e.g., Addison et al. 2004). Against the
background of our findings this does not come as a surprise. If the economic
effects of newly created works councils are less strong, studies focusing on
newly created councils may fail to find any effect. The results of those studies
cannot be generalized to the entire population of works councils.
Our analysis may also shed light on the functioning of codetermination in
international perspective. Indeed, studiesonEuropeanworks councils (EWCs)
suggest that theprovisionof training forworker representatives is an important
issue in negotiating EWC agreements (Gilman and Marginson 2002). This
indicates that learning is important also for this type of works council.
Finally, we recognize the need for continued research within the theme.
Future research could fruitfully build on panel data. Panel data would allow
observing the circumstanceswhen the council was created. Itwould be possible
to examine if the path of the learning process depends on the initial conditions.
Moreover, panel data would allow taking into account the development of
moderating influences over time. The role of structural breaks reinforcing or
mitigating the codetermination life could be examined.
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SUMMARY
This study provides the first econometric analysis on the dynamic dimension of establishment-level
codetermination in Germany. We hypothesize that learning implies a change in the nature and scope of
codetermination over time. Using unique data from small- and medium-sized establishments, our
empirical analysis provides strong evidence that learning indeed plays a crucial role in the functioning
of works councils. First, the probability of an adversarial relationship between management and works
council is decreasing in the age of the council. Second, the council’s age is positively associated with the
probability that the council has an influence even on decisions where it has no legal powers. Third,
productivity is increasing in the age of the council. Fourth, the quit rate is decreasing in the age of the
council. However, the estimates also provide evidence of a codetermination life cycle.
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